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Abstract. Payment channel networks like Bitcoin’s Lightning network are an auspicious approach
for realizing high transaction throughput and almost-instant confirmations in blockchain networks.
However, the ability to successfully make payments in such networks relies on the willingness of
participants to lock collateral in the network. In Lightning, the key financial incentive is to lock
collateral are small fees for routing payments for other participants. While users can choose these
fees, currently, they mainly stick to the default fees. By providing insights on beneficial choices for
fees, we aim to incentivize users to lock more collateral and improve the effectiveness of the network.
In this paper, we consider a node A that given the network topology and the channel details selects
where to establish channels and how much fee to charge such that its financial gain is maximized. We
formalize the optimization problem and show that it is NP-hard. We design a greedy algorithm to
approximate the optimal solution. In each step, our greedy algorithm selects a node which maximizes
the total reward concerning the number of shortest paths passing through A and channel fees. Our
simulation study leverages real-world data set to quantify the impact of our gain optimization and
indicates that our strategy is at least a factor two better than other strategies.
1 Introduction
Payment channel networks [14] overcome the need to globally agree on every transaction in a blockchain.
Instead, nodes can open and close channels that they can use to transfer coins directly. In the absence
of disputes, transactions only require local communication between the parties involved in a transaction.
Nodes without a direct payment channel can route payments via intermediaries to avoid the transaction
fees and delays for establishing a channel. By moving transactions off-chain, payment channels have the
potential to drastically increase the transaction throughput while reducing the confirmation times from
tens of minutes to sub-seconds. The most notable examples of payment channel networks are Bitcoin’s
Lightning [19] and Ethereum’s Raiden [2].
When opening a payment channel, nodes need to lock coins that they cannot use outside of the
channel during the lifetime of the channel. This opportunity cost makes it unattractive to maintain
payment channels. However, routing payments in a network require that the network has well-funded
channels [14]. The key incentives for locking collateral in a channel are i) frequent transaction with the
other party [7] and ii) financial gain through routing fees [11], i.e., fees that nodes charge for routing
payments as intermediaries. Our analysis on the Lightning network shows that the fees charged for
routing are currently low and mainly equal to the default value [21], we conjecture that the current
payment channel networks primarily rely on the first incentive. However, research on the Lightning
network suggests that this incentive entails networks of a low resilience with a few central hubs [22].
Analyzing the second incentives and show-casing that payments channels can entail financial profit is the
most promising avenue of research to incentivize the participation in payment channel networks and fully
leverage the potential of this promising blockchain scalability approach.
In this paper, we adapt a payment channel network model based on Lightning. We assume a known
topology and fees. Nodes select the cheapest path to conduct a payment. A node A aims to maximize its
profit through routing fees by choosing both its payment channels and fees. The problem is challenging
as higher fees indicate a higher profit if the node routes the payment but also a lower probability to be
chosen for routing due to the transactions taking the cheapest path.
Despite the importance of fees in payment channel networks, the issue has been mainly ignored in
past research. The majority of papers deal with cryptographic protocols for channel establishment and
multi-hop payments (e.g., [6, 7, 10, 15, 17]) as well as algorithms for routing payments (e.g., [16, 20, 23]).
There is some work on comparing routing fees to the on-chain fees of blockchains and presenting an
economical analysis of the relation between the two fee types [5,11]. It is interesting to note that routing
fees are related to the payment value whereas on-chain blockchain fees usually relate to the size of the
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transactions. In contrast, Di Stasi et al. [24] evaluated the impact of routing fees on keeping channels
balanced, i.e., ensuring that a channel is not used exclusively in one direction. The authors suggest a novel
linear fee policy for each channel to improve channel balances. Most similar to our work, Avarikioti et
al. [3] studied the optimal fee assignment of channels from the point of view of a payment service provider
(PSP). The authors analyzed optimal channel fees of the whole network that maximizes the total reward
of the PSP instead of focusing on a node, which defines our problem. In this manner, the authors presented
a linear program solving the optimal fee assignment when the network is tree-structured, which is a very
limiting assumption.
We are hence the first to cover the aspect of maximizing fees in payment channel networks. More
precisely, we formalize the problem of maximizing fees in a Lightning-inspired system model. We present
an algorithm for solving the defined optimization problem heuristically. Our greedy algorithm iteratively
i) adds channels and ii) selects fees such that each added channel increases the profit maximally for the
previously selected channels. For this purpose, we leverage the concept of vertex and edge betweenness
centrality, i.e., the fraction of cheapest paths a vertex or edge is contained in. We evaluate our algorithm for
real-world data set based on the Lightning network. Our evaluation strongly indicates that our approach
does not only greatly improve the profit in comparison to default fees but also that leveraging betweenness
centrality for selecting channels offers considerably better results than other network centrality measures.
More precisely, our algorithm increases the profit by a factor 4 in comparison to default fee values and is
at least a factor 2 better than other strategies based on network centrality metrics. An important result
is that the nodes with already established channels can still gain an advantage by using our fee selection
algorithm to replace their default fee values.
2 Background
This section summarizes key concepts from the field of payment channels required to understand the
remainder of the paper. Furthermore, as our algorithm relies on graph centrality metrics, this section
defines these metrics and gives some intuition on their role.
2.1 Payment Channel Networks
Payment channel networks (PCN) are one of the two key approaches to scaling blockchains by moving
transactions off-chain [14]. Two parties open a payment channel through an initial funding transaction on
the blockchain that locks coins such that they can only be used for transactions between the two parties.
After this initial funding transaction, the two parties can conduct payments without directly interacting
with the blockchain. They commit to the latest balance of the channel, i.e., the distribution of the total
number of locked coins over the two parties. For instance, let nodes u and v open a payment channel such
that u locks x coins and v locks y coins. The initial balance of the channel is (x, y) and its total capacity
is x+ y. If u sends one coin to v, the balance changes to (x− 1, y + 1).
In case of a dispute about the channel balance, the signed commitments documenting the state changes
are published on the blockchain. The blockchain consensus then assigns the coins according to the latest
valid channel state. Once the two parties decide to close their channel, they have to conduct a closing
transaction on the blockchain. Afterward, they receive the coins locked in the channel with the number of
coins per party corresponds to the channel balance at the time of the closure. In the absence of disputes,
the intermediary transactions are almost instant and the number of transaction is merely bound locally
by the bandwidth and latency of nodes.
Establishing a payment channel does not make sense if parties do not trade with each other regularly
due to i) the on-chain fees for establishing the channel and ii) the opportunity cost caused by locking
coins to the channel. Thus, most nodes will only establish a few channels with frequent trading partners.
Routing payments via a path consisting of multiple channels nevertheless allows nodes to trade without
having a direct channel. For instance, a node s can make a payment to a node r via two intermediary
nodes u and v, meaning that the payment is routed via three payment channels: s to u, u to v, and v to
r. The balances along all these channels change according to the transaction value.
The intermediary nodes charge fees for the use of their channels. For a channel Chi from u to v, these
fees consist of a basic fee BFChi for using the channel and fee rate FRChi per transferred unit. The
overall fee of a transaction tx for the channel is hence
f(Chi, tx) = BFChi + FRChi · |tx|, (1)
where |tx| denotes the transaction amount. The fees are determined by and paid to u. The sender s has
to pay the fees. Note that the fee calculation formula given in Equation 1 is specific for the Lightning
network [1]. Still, the other payment or state channel networks have a similar structure.
2.2 Graph Centrality Metrics
In this work, we model a PCN network as a directed graph. In this manner, each node in the payment
channel represents and vertex in the graph and each channel is represented by two directional edges
between the nodes (one for each direction). The channel fees correspond to the weights of the edges.
As a consequence, we can make use of graph metrics that characterize the importance of certain nodes
in a weighted directed graph. Our key metrics are (vertex) betweenness centrality and edge betweenness
centrality.
Definition 1 (Betweenness Centrality). The betweenness centrality of a vertex [12] is proportional
the total number of shortest paths that pass through that vertex, i.e.,
bc(v) =
∑
s6=t 6=v
σst 6=0
σstv
σst
,
where σst denotes the number of shortest paths between s and t and σstv is the number of such shortest
paths containing the vertex v.
Similarly, the edge betweenness centrality [13] of an edge relates to the total number of shortest paths
that pass through that edge, i.e.,
e([v1v2]) =
∑
s 6=t
σst 6=0
σst[v1v2]
σst
,
where σst[v1v2] is the number of shortest paths passing through the edge [v1v2].
We make use of the following result about vertex betweenness centrality to assess the suitability of
our greedy heuristic for selecting channel fees.
Theorem 1 ( [4]). For each vertex v, betweenness centrality function bc(v) is a monotone function for
the set of edges incident to n.
An important problem concerning the betweenness centrality is the maximum betweenness improve-
ment (MBI) problem.
Definition 2 (MBI problem [4]). For a given directed graph G and a node n, finding a limited number
of channels incident to node n such that bc(n) would be maximized is called as the maximum betweenness
improvement problem.
With the help of the following theorem on MBI problem, we prove that our problem of maximizing
the reward (MRI) is also NP-hard.
Theorem 2 ( [4]). MBI problem cannot be approximated in polynomial time within a factor greater than
1− 12 ,unless P = NP .
3 Our PCN Model
There are a number of PCNs with Lightning [19], Raiden [2], Perun [9] and Celer [8] being key examples.
All of them use slightly different assumptions and properties. We base our system model on Bitcoin’s
Lightning network.
In the following, we first describe our PCN model LN. In this model, we then define the problem of
an individual participant aiming to maximize their gain. We summarize the notation used in the paper
in Table 1 in Section A.
3.1 Network Topology, Fees, and Routing
Nodes open and close payment channels via. blockchain transaction. For simplicity, we assume that the
opening cost ChCost remains constant over time.
In Lightning, the complete topology of the network is known. Nodes publicly announce on the
blockchain that they establish or close a channel. Furthermore, nodes willing to route payments are
announcing their channels and fees to the complete network. Thus, we assume in our model that both the
topology and the fees of all nodes are publicly known. For simplicity, we assume that the topology and
routing fees of the nodes that do not strategically change them remain fixed over time. Otherwise, our fee
selection strategy would require a model to anticipate the expected changes. Current research on payment
channel networks does not provide such a model. Our analysis on the Lightning network indicates that
fees are indeed usually the default value. As topology changes require on-chain transactions, which are
costly in both time and on-chain fees, the topology also should not change considerably. Moreover, we
assume that nodes apply source routing to find one cheapest path from source to destination, as is the
case in the current implementation of Lightning.
3.2 Problem Definition
We represent a network LN as a graph G = (V,E) of V vertices V and edges E, we consider A that wants
to maximize its revenue in running a node in a payment channel network. A opens channels with other
nodes in the network, each channel having a total cost of ChCost for opening and closing. We assume
that A can strategically select the nodes it establishes channels with from all nodes in the network. After
all, these nodes do not need to invest anything into the channel as A completely funds them and will
likely receive additional monetary gains through routing fees. We assume that A has a budget of c(A)
coins to use as collateral for the channels in total.
Formally, let C be the set of chosen channels. For each channel Chi ∈ C, we have the coins allocated to
the channel c(Chi) and the channel fee f(Chi, tx) for a transaction value tx. Wlog, transaction values are
integers between 1 and Tmax following a distribution T . Let Xi(tx, S,R) be the event that a transaction
of value tx going from a node S to a node R passes through the channel Chi. Then the expected fee
from that transaction is f(Chi, tx)Pr[Xi(tx, S,R)]. Last, we require the distribution M that returns a
sender-receiver pair. A’s objective is to find C, f , and c() such that the overall expected gain of one
transaction
∑
∀S,R∈V
S 6=R 6=A
Pr(M = (S,R))
Tmax∑
j=1
Pr(T = j)
∑
Chi∈C
f(Chi, j) · Pr[Xi(j, S,R)] (2)
is maximized while adhering to the constraint that
∑
Chi∈C c(Chi) ≤ c(A). Equation 2 computes the
expected gain over the involved variables T and M . If the capacity of the channel c(Chi) is less than the
transaction amount tx, Pr[Xi(tx, S,R)] = 0. Similarly, if there does not exist a shortest path from S to
R that passes through Chi, Pr[Xi(tx, S,R)] = 0. Otherwise, Pr[Xi(tx, S,R)] is equal to the number of
shortest paths from S to R passing through Chi divided by the total number of shortest paths from S
to R.
Note that Equation 2 ignores the cost of opening C channels, |C| · ChCost. The impact of this cost
depends on the number of transactions K that occur during the lifetime of a channel. Let max be the
maximal value for Equation 2. The overall gain of the node is then the difference: K ·max−|C| ·ChCost.
By increasing the lifetime of the channel arbitrarily, the impact of |C| ·ChCost diminishes, which is why
we disregard it for Equation 2. Our model furthermore disregards the opportunity cost caused by locking
coins due to the absence of suitable models for such a cost.
4 Our Fee Strategy
We start by showing that maximizing the objective function given in Equation 2 is NP-hard. Afterward,
we present our greedy algorithm for approximating a solution. As our algorithm contains an equation for
choosing channel fees without a closed-form solution, the last part of the section demonstrates a method
for solving the equation numerically.
Our proof and algorithm act on a version of Equation 2 for specific distributions T and M . In the
absence of real-world data for these distributions, we utilize two straight-forward distributions. Concretely,
our work considers a fixed transaction value, i.e., the random variable T only takes one value tx. For
the distribution M , which characterizes the likelihood of two nodes to trade, assuming that all nodes are
equally likely to trade with each other is the most natural choice in the absence of a concrete alternative
model. Thus, M is a uniform distribution over all pairs of nodes in the following.
For the design of our algorithm, we furthermore bound the maximal channel fee by fmax. Assuming a
maximal channel fee does not reduce the generality of our approach. As nodes send payments along the
path with the lowest fee, any channel fee that entails the channel is not contained in any such path can
be disregarded.
4.1 NP-hardness of the Problem
Before presenting the actual proof, we rephrase Equation 2 to relate it to the concept of (edge) betweenness
centrality.
Choosing M to be a uniform distribution implies that Pr(M = (S,R)) = 1(|V |−1)(|V |−2)
1 is a constant,
which can disregarded for the optimization. Furthermore, choosing a constant transaction value tx removes
the second sum in Equation 2. Hence our modified objective function is∑
Chi∈C
f(Chi, tx) · Pr[Xi(tx, S,R)]. (3)
The next step relates Pr[Xi(tx, S,R)] in Equation 3 to the betweenness centrality. There are two
important quantities to consider: the number of shortest paths including the channel and total fee reward
gained from these paths. Maximizing the number of shortest paths passing through a channel or node
corresponds to the edge or vertex betweenness centrality (BC), respectively, as defined in Section 2.
However, maximizing the BC does not necessarily imply maximal revenue. As fees represent edge weights,
the shortest path here is a path whose edges have the minimal sum of weights. Choosing low fees hence
increases the probability to be contained in the shortest path but low fees also indicate a low gain from
each transaction.
Rather, the expected reward of a channel Chi is equal to the probability of the transaction passing
through that channel times the fee. Note that each channel needs to have a capacity of at least tx for the
payment to choose this path, thus a optimal solution for Equation 3 will only create channels of sufficient
capacity and we can exclude the capacity aspect from Pr[Xi(tx, S,R)]. With e(Chi) denoting the edge
betweenness centrality of a channel Chi with fees f(Chi)
2, the formal expression for the expected reward
of Chi is
ER(Chi) = f(Chi) · e(Chi). (4)
As a consequence, the total expected reward of A from Equation 3 is
ER(A) =
∑
∀Chi∈C
ER(Chi). (5)
Now, we can formally define the problem from Equation 2 as the maximum reward improvement (MRI)
problem.
Definition 3 (MRI Problem). For a payment channel network LN and a node n, the problem of
finding a set of channels C such that ER(n) is maximized is called the maximum reward improvement
problem.
The following theorem states that it is not possible to design an algorithm CSF that finds the optimum
solution within polynomial time, unless P = NP .
Theorem 3 (MRI Approximation Theorem). MRI problem cannot be approximated in polynomial
time within a factor greater than 1− 12 , unless P = NP .
Proof. To prove this theorem, we reduce our MRI problem to MBI problem presented in Definition 2.
Using Equation 5, we can formulate the MRI problem as follows:
MRI(LN, n,Nc)→ CHM = argmax
∀ |CH|≤Nc
s(Chi)=n
∀ f(Chi)∈[1,fmax]
(
ER(n) =
∑
∀Chi∈CH
ER(Chi)
)
.
1 (|V | − 1)(|V | − 2) is the number of pairs of nodes when not including A
2 For the rest of section, we drop the transaction amount tx from the channel fee formula f(Chi) as it is fixed.
We introduce a subproblem, namely MRI FF, where the upper limit of the fee fmax is equal to 1,
which means that all the channel fee are equal to 1. Using the Equation 4, MRI FF can be formulated as:
MRI FF(LN, n,Nc)→ CHM = argmax
∀ |CH|≤Nc
s(Chi)=n
( ∑
∀Chi∈CH
e(Chi)
)
(6)
(∗)
= argmax
∀ |CH|≤Nc
s(Chi)||r(Chi)=n
(bcn)
(∗∗)
= MBI(LN, n,Nc),
which reduces to the MBI problem. Here, the first equality (∗) holds because the summation of the all
shortest paths passing from out-going edges is equal to the total number of shortest paths passing through
that node. In other words, the summation of edge betweenness centrality of all out-going edges of a node
is equal to betweenness centrality of that node. The second equality (∗) follows from the definition of the
MBI problem given in Definition 2.
Now, we can prove our theorem by contradiction. Let assume there exists an approximation to MRI
problem within a factor greater than 1− 12 . Then, the same approximation would hold for the subproblem
of MRI, MRI FF with a certain maximal fee, namely 1. However, in Equation 6, we showed that MRI FF
problem is equivalent to the MBI problem. This contradicts Theorem 2. Therefore, MRI problem cannot
be polynomially approximated within a factor greater than 1− 12 , unless P = NP .
4.2 Channel Selection Function
We present a greedy algorithm CSF to approximate the MRI problem. CSF takes the PCN and the requested
number of channels as input and outputs the set of nodes to whom channels are created. It internally
calls CFF, the algorithm for deciding the fee of a channel. Formally, we have
CFF(CH ∪ Ch)→ RCh :
RCh = TotalER(CH ∪ Ch, f) where f = argmax
fi∈[1,fmax]
(TotalER(CH ∪ Ch, fi)) ,
TotalER(CH ∪ Ch, fi) = ER(Ch)f(Ch)=fi +
∑
∀Chj∈CH
ER(Chj). (7)
As detailed in Algorithm 1, our greedy algorithm for CSF consists of the following five key steps:
1. Start with an initial PCN of nodes and channels.
2. At each step, try all possible channels between our node and other nodes.
3. Compute the maximum reward of the channel by using CFF.
4. Connect to the node who gives the maximum reward and update the PCN.
5. Go to step (2) until the desired number of channels is established.
Next, we ascertain that channel additions cannot reduce the expected revenue, indicating that nodes
should add all channels they can fund. Here, it is important to note that we do not take into account the
channel opening cost ChCost. Thus, if the marginal reward improvement of a new channel is zero, there
is no point in add the channel.
Theorem 4 (Monotonicity). The objective function of Algorithm 1 is a monotone non-decreasing
function.
Proof. A function F : Ω → R is a monotone function if it satisfies the following condition:
∀S ⊆ T ⊆ Ω, F(S) ≤ F(T ). (8)
In our case, for any solution CH to MRI and for any node ni such that [n, ni] /∈ CH, the following inequality
holds CFF(CH∪ [n, ni]) ≥ CFF(CH). Note that CFF checks for all possible fee values to maximize the total
reward. In that sense, it would be enough to show that for the maximum fee value fmax, which can be
formulated by using Equation 7 (with LN0 = LN ∪ CH and LNi = LN ∪ CH ∪ [n, ni]):
Algorithm 1 Channel Selection Function
Input: LN and Nc
Output: CH
1: function CSF(LN, Nc)
2: CH ← ∅
3: while |CH| < Nc do
4: maxRew ← 0, selectednode = None
5: for Each node ni ∈ LN do
6: Create a channel between (n, ni): LNi ← AddEdges(LN, [n, ni])
7: Calculate the reward Rni ← CFF(LNi, CH ∪ [n, ni])
8: if maxRew ≤ Rni then
9: maxRew = Rni
10: selectednode = ni
11: end if
12: end for
13: CH ← CH⋃{selectednode}
14: LN← AddEdges(LN, [n, selectednode])
15: end while
16: return CH
17: end function
CFF(LN, CH ∪ [n, ni]) ≥ TotalER(LN, CH ∪ [n, ni], f = fmax)
?≥ CFF(LN, CH) ⇐⇒
ER(Ch,LNi)f(Ch)=fmax +
∑
∀Chj∈CH
ER(Chj ,LNi)
?≥
∑
∀Chj∈CH
ER(Chj ,LN0) ⇐⇒
e([n, ni],LNi) · fmax +
∑
∀Chj∈CH
e(Chj ,LNi) · f(Chj)
?≥
∑
∀Chj∈CH
e(Chj ,LN0) · f(Chj)
⇐⇒ e([n, ni],LNi) · fmax
?≥
∑
∀Chj∈CH
(e(Chj ,LN0)− e(Chj ,LNi)) · f(Chj)
(∗)⇐= e([n, ni],LNi)
?≥
∑
∀Chj∈CH
(e(Chj ,LN0)− e(Chj ,LNi))
⇐⇒ e([n, ni],LNi) +
∑
∀Chj∈CH
e(Chj ,LNi)
?≥
∑
∀Chj∈CH
e(Chj ,LN0)
(∗∗)⇐⇒ bc(n,LNi)
?≥ bc(n,LN0).
Here, (∗) condition is true since for all channels f(Chi) ≤ fmax by the definition. (∗∗) is satisfied since
the summation of edge betweenness centrality of all out-going edges of a node is equal to betweenness
centrality of that node. At the end, bc(n,LNi) ≥ bc(n,LN0) holds because betweenness centrality is a
monotone function, see Theorem 1.
4.3 Efficient Search Algorithm for the Channel Fee Function
No closed-form formula finds the best fee amount maximizing the expected reward due to the term e(Ch)
for a channel Ch. Here, we analyze Equation 4 to minimize the computational cost by discarding some
parts of the search space. First of all, since e(LN) is not affected by the changes in the fees of channels,
the denominator is irrelevant for optimizing the ER(Ch). Therefore, CFF can be seen as function of the
EBC of the channel e(Ch) and the fee f(Ch). Secondly, e(Ch) is negatively affected by f(Ch) because
increasing the fee means an increase in the weight of the edge that results in a lower chance of being in
the shortest paths (see Figure 3 in Section B for an illustrative example).
Two observations give rise to an efficient search algorithm for finding the most suitable fee. The
first observation utilizes the fact that edge betweenness centrality is a monotone decreasing function
concerning the channel fee. Let the expected reward of a channel for chosen fees f3 > f1 be r1 = e1 · f1
and r3 = e3 · f3, respectively. If r3 > r1, let
f2 = f1 · r3
r1
= f3 · e3
e1
. (9)
It can be seen that the expected reward for any fee fα, namely rα, where f1 < fα ≤ f2 is at most r3:
rα = eα · fα ≤ e1 · fα ≤ e1 · f2 = e3 · f3 = r3. (10)
In other words, there is no need to compute the expected reward values for the fees in between f1 and
f2 as they cannot be optimal values.
The second observation is that increasing the fee of an out-going channel Ch cannot decrease the edge
betweenness of another out-going channel Ch′ of the same node. Such an increase can only reduce the
edge betweenness of channels that are on a path containing Ch by removing the path from the set of
shortest paths. However, as shortest paths cannot have loops, two out-going channels of the same node
cannot be on the same shortest path. Now, let CH be the set of previously selected channels. Let r′1 and
r′3 be the sum of the expected fees of all channels Ch
′ ∈ CH for fees f1 and f3 with f3 > f1. By the above
observation, we have r′3 ≥ r′1.
Our recursive algorithm divides the space of all possible fee values from 1 to fmax into d intervals. For
each interval i, let ri = ER(Ch, f(Ch) = fi) be the expected reward of Ch, r
′
i ←
∑
∀Ch′∈CH ER(Ch
′, f(Ch′))
be the total reward of the other channels. By the first observation, the maximal increase in ri is
fi+1
fi
and
by the second observation r′i+1 ≥ r′i as fi+1 > fi. Thus, the maximum possible reward value for interval i
is R˜i = ri · fi+1fi +r′i+1. If R˜i is greater than the current maximum reward value, the algorithm recursively
searches for a maximum in the interval, otherwise discards the interval. We present the pseudocode for
the algorithm in Section C.
This completes the description of our algorithm, which we evaluate in the following in comparison to
other approaches based on common centrality metrics.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our proposed fee strategy for a real-world topology. Our evaluation quantifies
the total reward gained by A when using our greedy algorithm.
To emphasize the high effectiveness of our solution, we compared it with other channel and fee
selection algorithm. For the channel selection, we considered random nodes as well as connecting to
nodes with a high centrality for three centrality metrics: i) degree, i.e., connecting to the nodes with the
most connections, ii) betweenness centrality, and iii) pagerank [18]. For the fee strategy, we compute the
results for both cases where the channel fees are the default values and they are determined by CFF.
5.1 Model
In Lightning network, the upcoming transactions and current balances of channels are not known. Thus,
we need to model the network and transactions.
Transactions. Like Section 4, our evaluation assumes that all source-destination pairs are equally likely.
Furthermore, we categorize the transactions into three groups based on the amounts:
– Micro payments are the transactions involving a very small amount of coins. To represent this cate-
gory, we use the transaction amount of 100 Satoshi, which is about one cent3. An example of a use
case would be the streaming services where you pay small amounts per service.
– Medium payments: are the transactions spent for daily living expenses like buying a coffee, which is
represented with 10000 Satoshi.
– Macro payments: are transactions of high amounts, which is represented with 1000000 Satoshi. The
amount of these transactions are in the order of 100 Euros.
From these categories, it is most likely that micro payments are usually restricted to nodes that have
a direct channel. Otherwise, the base fee for the payment greatly exceeds the actual payment value.
Therefore, our target transactions are medium and macro payments, which are analyzed separately.
3 https://awebanalysis.com/en/convert-satoshi-to-euro-eur/
Network. Following our system model in Section 3, networks are represented as weighted directed graphs.
The weights of the edges in the graph model are calculated according to the fee rate and base fees of
the channels. Since the fee rate depends on the transaction amount, the weights of the same edges for
medium and macro payments will be different. The graph generated for the medium (macro) payments
is called medium (macro) graph.
5.2 Setup
We obtained a snapshot of the Lightning Network (LN) data from 1ml.com on July 10 2019, which
contains 4618 nodes and 68729 edges in total. When we delete the edges with insufficient capacity, the
medium graph has 68697 edges and the macro graph has 32193 edges.
As a node requires at least two connections to be contained in any shortest paths, we first connected
A to the two nodes with the highest degree (, which happen to have the highest pagerank as well). For
these two connections, we use the default fee rate and base fee values in both directions of the edges.
Based on this initial scenario, we now connect A to additional nodes.
The experiments use ChCost = 8192 Satoshi, which reflects the fluctuating Bitcoin transaction fee
estimates4. When establishing a new channel, our simulation added edges in both directions. The base
fee and the fee rate of the in-coming edge correspond to the default value to model that i) most users
currently stick to the default values and ii) A has no control over the in-coming channel fees as they are
determined by the other party. For the outgoing edges, we utilize either CFF to determine the best fee
value or use default values. When using CFF, we restrict the fmax = ChCost. Otherwise, the total fee
cost of the transaction in the payment network is higher than the cost in the Bitcoin network and the
sender is hence unlikely to proceed with the payment.
5.3 Experimental Results
Figures 1 and 2 show the performance of our greedy algorithm in comparison to the other approaches
in terms of the total reward improvement per new channel connections. The x-axis shows the number of
connections added and the y-axis represents the total reward of node A. Since, for each case, we start
with the same two connections, the total reward values have the same offset.
Figure 1 displays the result for the medium graph. When using default values, the reward is consistently
lower than for our fee selection algorithm. More precisely, for centrality-based selection of channels, fee
optimization increases the reward by a factor of roughly 2. Selecting channels strategically doubles the
gain further in comparison to using Pagerank centrality, which is the most beneficial one of the centrality-
based selection methods. Figure 2 shows the results of macro graph. The results are similar to the case
of medium payments, though the overall gain is slightly higher.
In terms of fee computation efficiency, our experimental results show that the recursive algorithm is
given in Algorithm 1 reduces the search space of fees in the magnitude of 10–100.
5.4 Discussion
From the experimental results, it can be seen that our greedy algorithm outperforms the centrality
metrics. Furthermore, the beneficial effect of the fee selection function can be observed by comparing the
results with and without it.
Note that adding new connections to the nodes with the highest centrality metrics does not increase
the total reward in comparison to random selection much, in particular for betweenness centrality. The
reason here is that connecting to nodes with many shortest path passing them does not imply that the
newly added channel offers a shorter path. Instead, directly focusing on the betweenness centrality of A
results in larger improvements.
Figure 1 and 2 furthermore show few but notable differences between medium and macro payments.
First, the overall gain is higher for macro payments as expected due to the higher transaction value and
hence increased revenue for a similar fee rate. However, the base rate, which is 1000 Satoshi by default5
in comparison to a default rate of 0.001, dominates the fee value, so that the 100-fold increase in the
transaction value does not translate to a similar increase in gain. Secondly, the differences between various
centrality measures are more distinct for macro payments, see Figure 2.
4 https://bitcoinfees.info/
5 The default fee values may change regarding the imported implementation. Our analysis on dataset shows that
33177 out of 68733 edges use the defaults we adopted.
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Fig. 1. Total fee reward of our node in medium graph. The bottom figure excludes the greedy results to present
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Fig. 2. Total fee reward of our node in macro graph. The bottom figure excludes the greedy results to present a
clear comparison of the rest.
Overall, our greedy algorithm promises higher fees for individual nodes. Even if nodes cannot or do
not desire to select their channels, they can still gain an advantage by using our more sophisticated fee
selection algorithm for already established channels.
One key limitation of our design is that it does not consider channel capacities as such. When all
transactions have the same known value, A will only establish channels with sufficient collateral. However,
in practice, A does not have such information and routing may fail due to a lack of capacity. Thus,
integrating capacity information into both our model and our evaluation is clearly necessary in the
future.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we formalized an optimization problem for maximizing fees in payment channel networks,
presented a heuristic algorithm for solving the problem, and evaluated our algorithm on real-world data
sets. Our work demonstrates that routing fees can be a strong incentive for locking coins in payment
channels. Fees as incentive hence have the potential to motivate rational users to fund payment channel
and hence increase the ability of these networks to route payments.
In this work, we focused on one individual node aiming to optimize its profit. Future work should
design a game-theoretical framework for networks containing only rational nodes aiming to maximize their
profit. For the continued usage of payment channel networks, incentives should ensure that strategies for
optimizing profit locally also optimize the overall network health in terms of the availability of cost-
effective paths. It remains an open question if the current fee model is a suitable incentive to further
collaboration and network health.
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A Notation
The list of abbreviations and notations are given in Table 1.
Table 1. Notation and Abbreviation Table
Symbol Explanation
CSF The channel selection function.
CFF The channel fee function.
CDF The capacity distribution function.
LN The payment network.
c(X) The total amount of coins of X.
f(Chi) The charging fee of the channel Chi.
s(Chi), r(Chi) The source and destination nodes of the channel Chi.
s(tx), r(tx) The sender and receiver of the transaction tx.
ChCost The channel opening and closing on-chain cost.
B Illustrative example of the EBC vs. fee relationship of a channel
C Pseudocode Channel Fee Function
Algorithm 2 is a recursive algorithm for determining the best fee in one step of the greedy algorithm.
Algorithm 2 Channel Fee Function
Input: LN, CH and Ch
Output: Rmax and fmax
1: function CFF(LN, CH ∪ Ch, fl, fh)
2: % Initialization: fl ← 1, fh ← ChCost,Rmax ← 0, fmax ← 1
3: % d is the division parameter
4: if fh − fl ≤ d then % Anchor step:
5: for f ∈ {fl, . . . , fh} do
6: [r, r′]← TotalER(CH ∪ Ch, f)
7: Calculate the reward R← r + r′
8: if R ≥ Rmax then
9: Rmax ← R
10: fmax ← f
11: end if
12: end for
13: return
14: else % Recursion step:
15: for i ∈ {1, . . . , d} do
16: fi ← i · fh−fld + fl
17: end for
18: for i ∈ {1, . . . , d} do
19: [ri, r
′
i]← TotalER(CH ∪ Ch, fi)
20: Calculate the reward Ri = ri + r
′
i
21: if Ri ≥ Rmax then
22: Rmax ← Ri
23: fmax ← fi
24: end if
25: end for
26: for i ∈ {1, . . . , d} do
27: Calculate the possible maximum reward R˜i = ri · fi+1fi + r
′
i+1
28: if R˜i > Rmax then
29: fl ← fi, fh ← fi+1
30: return CFF(LN, CH ∪ Ch, fl, fh)
31: else
32: % Do nothing - Discard this interval
33: end if
34: end for
35: end if
36: end function
37:
38: function TotalER(CH ∪ Ch, f)
39: r ← ER(Ch, f(Ch) = f)
40: r′ ←∑∀Chj∈CH ER(Chj , f(Chj))
41: return [r, r′]
42: end function
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Fig. 3. Illustrative example of the EBC vs. fee relationship of a channel.
